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AN ANALYSIS OF THE WEB OF CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR
DEFECTIVE PRICING OF
GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS
W Bruce Shirk, Esq. * and Bennett D. Greenberg, Esq. **
In the past year, the federal government has intensified its campaign to
curb waste, fraud, and abuse in government contracting, especially in gov-
ernment defense contracting. Consider the following developments:
1. In the 1983 Defense Authorization Act,' Congress mandated the
creation of a new Inspector General (IG) post for the Department of De-
fense.2 Section 1117(b) of the Act empowers the IG to act as principal
adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the prevention
and detection of fraud and abuse. This same section grants the IG the
power to initiate, conduct, and supervise audits and investigations as the
IG deems appropriate.3
2. The Department of Justice, in conjunction with the Department of
Defense, has established an investigative Procurement Fraud Unit to
probe and prosecute fraud in the purchase of military equipment.4 The
Unit is composed of attorneys from the Criminal and Civil Divisions of
the Department of Justice, attorneys from the Defense Department, the
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The authors wish to express their thanks to Laura K. Kennedy and Martin J. Golub,
Associates of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, for their contributions to this
article.
1. Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 718
(1982).
2. Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1117, 96 Stat. 718, 750-53 (1982).
3. Id Joseph H. Sherick has been chosen to fill the new Defense Department IG post.
One of Mr. Sherick's first acts in his new position was to reform the Defense Department's
waste and fraud "hotline." Gordon, The Pentagon Fraud and Waste Hotline Is Producing
Results-Sometimes, 15 NAT. J. 1058 (1983).
4. Associated Press, New Unit Is Formed to Probe Military Procurement Fraud, Aug.
24, 1982.
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United States Attorney's office in the Eastern District of Virginia, and in-
vestigators from both the Defense and Justice Departments.5 The Pro-
curement Fraud Unit was designed to provide leadership and coordination
with the audit and investigative resources already in place at the Depart-
ment of Defense.6 Moreover, the Unit was created to provide a consistent
pattern in federal prosecution of procurement fraud cases.7
3. Senator Roth introduced a bill entitled the Program Fraud Civil
Penalties Act of 1983 that would allow the Department of Defense, as well
as other federal agencies, administratively to impose civil penalties against
contractors who defraud the federal government.8 The bill would allow
agencies to assess civil penalties for fraud without relying on the Justice
Department. Under the bill, anyone who knowingly makes a false state-
ment or claim to the government would face a civil penalty of $10,000 for
each false claim, plus double the amount of money paid or value of prop-
erty or services delivered as a result of the false statement or claim.9 Alter-
natively, agencies could recover double the amount of damages incurred,
including the costs of investigating the claim, and consequential dam-
ages.1 The bill does, however, limit administrative fraud proceedings to
claims not exceeding $100,000." Senator Roth and other supporters of the
bill believe that the bill will be effective in combating smaller fraud cases
that the Justice Department does not prosecute due to a lack of
resources. 12
4. The government has reacted aggressively to the "horror stories" of
the purchase by the military services of spare parts at grossly inflated
prices. 13 The issue of excessive pricing for spare parts was raised when a
draft report from the Defense Department's Inspector General was made
5. R. Olsen, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of
Justice, Remarks Before ABA, FBA, and D.C. Bar Ass'n (Feb. 10, 1983). The Procurement
Fraud Unit is headed by Richard Sauber, an attorney from the Fraud section of the Crimi-
nal Division, and is located in Alexandria, Virginia. In his address, Olsen noted that the
unit's geographical proximity to the Department of Defense will permit greater coordination
of investigative manpower.
6. D. Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice,
Remarks Before ABA-Public Contract Law section (Feb. 4, 1983).
7. Id
8. S. 1566, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REC. 9491-96 (1983). Senator Roth is plan-
ning to introduce the same bill in the 99th Congress.
9. S. 1566, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., § 802 (1983).
10. Id
11. Id § 806.
12. See supra note 8.
13. See Silver & Homing, Draft Report Details Huge P & W Overcharges, JOURNAL
INQUIRER, July 12, 1983, at 3; Ahern, Another Military Overpricing "Horror Story" Surfaces,
JOURNAL INQUIRER, July 14, 1983, at 4.
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public by the Project on Military Procurement, a nonprofit organization
that gathers information on the cost of weapons.' 4 The report, which fo-
cuses on the review of the procurement of engine spare parts, reveals that
Navy and Air Force contracting officers were not buying engine spare
parts in a cost-effective manner because procedures designed to assure that
the government pay fair and reasonable prices were not being imple-
mented.'" These revelations of gross overpricing have been a source of
embarrassment to government officials, and public and congressional out-
cry prompted Defense officials to institute new measures to combat waste
and fraud in government contracting.' 6 For example, Defense Secretary
Caspar W. Weinberger, in a memorandum to Defense officials, announced
a ten-point strategy to eliminate excessive pricing in government contracts
in the future."' The plan relies on a two-pronged approach: internal De-
partment of Defense efforts and dealings with government contractors.
The first prong calls for increased competitive bidding and stern discipli-
nary action against Defense employees who are negligent in implementing
Defense procedures. The second prong calls for, in part, the Defense De-
partment to exercise legal rights and seek refunds from contractors guilty
of excess pricing.
The foregoing examples clearly demonstrate the federal government's
commitment to eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse in government con-
tracting. At the same time, these recent developments indicate that the
government contractor occupies an extremely vulnerable position in the
procurement process. A contractor that fails to deal with the government
honestly may become entangled in a web of civil and criminal liability. It
is the government contractor's vulnerability that is the focus of this article.
More specifically, this article explores in detail the potential civil and
criminal liability that may result when the government contractor certifies
that cost or pricing data submitted in price negotiations with the govern-
ment are accurate, complete, and current but later are discovered to be
14. H. Bloom, Draft Report on the Audit of the Procurement of Aircraft Engine Spare
Parts (Project 3AP-021) (June 10, 1983) (Director Acquisition Support Programs, Office of
the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing).
15. Id The report revealed that prices for the engine spares had escalated rapidly and
were well in excess of inflation-related increases (some as much as 500%).
16. The Associated Press, "hen is a Pencil Not a Pencil? Ask the Pentagon, Aug. 5,
1983.
17. Defense Secretary Weinberger, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military De-
partments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, Assistant
Secretaries of Defense, General Counsel, Inspector General, Assistants to the Secretary De-
fense, Directors of the Defense Agencies (July 25, 1983), reprined in 40 FED. CONTRACTS
158 (1983).
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defective (i.e., inaccurate, incomplete, noncurrent). 8 In particular, we fo-
cus on the government contractor's potential liability under the Truth in
Negotiations Act,' 9 as well as under what is commonly referred to as the
False Claims Act.2" At the same time, we explore the interrelationship
between the Truth in Negotiations Act and the False Claims Act. 2'
We have chosen defective pricing to illustrate the government contrac-
tor's vulnerability in the procurement process for three reasons. First, as
the Department of Defense's response to overpricing of spare parts indi-
cates, the government is intent on vigilantly monitoring the pricing of gov-
ernment procurements. Second, the pricing of government contracts is a
complex, time-consuming process that involves gathering and processing
information from many different departments within the contractor's or-
ganization. Given the financial and technical complexities involved, the
potential for defective pricing is always present. Third, government con-
tractors have failed to appreciate the seriousness and the full consequences
of defective pricing. While many contractors are aware of their liability
under the Truth in Negotiations Act, few contractors realize that defective
pricing may lead to potential liability under .the False Claims Act as well.
Thus, to aid in our analysis, we have divided our discussion into three
18. In addition to the government contractor's obligation to certify the cost or pricing
data, the government contractor throughout the contracting process is required to make nu-
merous certifications as to compliance with various laws and regulations. For example, as
part of the government contractor's proposal submission, the contractor may be required to
certify that: (1) it has not paid or agreed to pay any company, other than a bona fide em-
ployee working solely for the offeror, a contingent fee upon the award of the contract; (2) it
does not maintain segregated facilities; and/or (3) it does not utilize any facilities in the
performance of the proposed contract that have been listed on the Environmental Protection
Agency's list of violating facilities. See Armed Service Procurement Regulation F-100.33,
Standard Form 33: Solicitation, Offer, and Award (1979, 1980, 1981); Armed Service Pro-
curement Regulation F-100-33, Standard Form 33 (Exception): Solicitation, Offer, and
Award (1979, 1981). Failure to make an accurate certification may expose the contractor to
civil and criminal liability as well as lead to the contractor's debarment or suspension.
19. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(0 (1982).
20. The original False Claims Act, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863), has been continually
recodified into civil and criminal statutes. Presently, the False Claims Act consists of The
Criminal False Claims Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1982), the Criminal False Statements Stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982), and the Civil False Claims Statute, 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (1982).
21. While we limit our analysis to these statutes, the government contractor's potential
liability does not stop here. For example, to the extent that two or more persons conspire to
submit false statements or claims, the contractor may be prosecuted under the Federal Con-
spiracy Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982). Moreover, if the contractor used the mail or wires to
defraud or obtain money or property from the government, the contractor may be prose-
cuted under the Mail Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), and the Wire Fraud Statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1343 (1982). If the contractor has engaged in two acts of mail or wire fraud over
the last ten years, it may be prosecuted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982).
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parts. Part I sets forth the elements that constitute a prima facie violation
of the Truth in Negotiations Act. Part II discusses the elements that con-
stitute a prima facie violation of the False Claims Act.22 Part III then
analyzes, in the context of a hypothetical example, the contractor's liability
for defective pricing under the Truth in Negotiations Act and the False
Claims Act, and the interrelationship between these two Acts.
I. THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR'S LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE
PRICING UNDER THE TRUTH IN NEGOTIATIONS ACT
A. The Operation Of The Truth In Negotiations Act
The Truth in Negotiations Act requires a government contractor to sub-
mit cost or pricing data in negotiating procurements and to certify that
such data are accurate, complete and current as of the date that the agree-
ment is reached on the price.23 The Act applies to negotiated Defense De-
partment and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
prime or subcontracts and modifications to those contracts in excess of
$500,000. The Act exempts from its coverage negotiated contracts where
the price is based on adequate price competition or established catalog or
market prices of commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the gen-
eral public.24
The legislative intent of the Truth in Negotiations Act was to eliminate
overpricing in the negotiation of noncompetitive defense contracts. Con-
gress believed that overpricing resulted from the failure of contractors to
disclose, during the pricing of defense contracts, complete, current, and
accurate cost and pricing data:
In determining the price under many types of negotiated con-
tracts the Government must rely, at least in part, on cost and
22. In the discussion of the False Claims Act, the elements that constitute a violation of
the Civil False Claims Statute, 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (1982), the Criminal False Claims Stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1982), and The Criminal False Statements Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(1982), are discussed separately.
23. Pub. L. No. 87-653, 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1982). The certification threshold was
raised from $100,000 to $500,000 on December 1, 1981. Pub. L. No. 97-86, 95 Stat. 1117
(1981), codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1-3-807.3(2) (1983).
24. Although the Truth in Negotiations Act does not govern contracts with civilian
agencies, these agencies have nonetheless adopted the Act's procedures as reflected in Fed-
eral Procurement Regulations (FPR) § 3-807.3 to 3-807.5. Effective April 1, 1984, the Fed-
eral Acquisition Regulations (FAR) will become the primary regulations for federal
procurement, replacing the Defense Acquisition Regulations, Federal Procurement Regula-
tions and NASA Procurement Regulations. The objective of FAR is both to simplify and to
unify the three sets of federal procurement regulations that currently govern defense, civilian
and NASA procurements. The FAR provisions governing cost or pricing data are set forth
in 48 Fed. Reg. 42,186-219 (1983) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. § 1).
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pricing data submitted by the contractor or his subcontractor. In
recent years the General Accounting Office submitted several re-
ports to the Congress on cases in which contractors received unwar-
ranted profits because the data used in establishing target costs or
prices were inaccurate, incomplete, or out of date. Although many
of these reports were on incentive contracts, the objective of
avoiding enhanced profits through failure to inform the con-
tracting agency of the most current, accurate, and complete cost
data is equally desirable in other types of negotiated contracts.
25
To prevent overpricing, the Truth in Negotiations Act and its provisions,
as set forth in the Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR), require that a
government contractor submit cost or pricing data with its proposal in a
negotiated procurement exceeding $500,000.26 The contractor must sub-
mit data on DD Form 63327 and certify that the submitted cost or pricing
data is "accurate, complete and current" as of the date the agreement is
reached on price.28 The submission of inaccurate, incomplete, or noncur-
rent data will result in a defective pricing action whereby the government
is entitled to a reduction in the contract price equal to the amount that the
contract has been overpriced.29
To understand the government contractor's obligation under the Act, it
is necessary to identify the cost or pricing data that the government re-
quires the contractor to submit. Cost or pricing data is defined as all
"facts" existing up to the time of agreement on price that prudent buyers
and sellers would reasonably expect to have a significant effect on price
negotiations.3 ° Cost or pricing data embraces more than historical ac-
counting data and must be the kind of factual data that is capable of being
verified. Such data includes: (a) historical accounting data, (b) vendor
25. S. REP. No. 1884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in, U.S. CODE CONG. AND
AD. NEWS 2476, 2477 (emphasis added).
26. 32 C.F.R. § 1-3-807.3(2) (1983).
27. Id. Under this section the contractor is required to submit data on forms pursuant
to § 1-16-806, or to specifically identify such data in writing if actual submission is not
possible.
28. Id. 32 C.F.R. § 1-3-807.4 sets forth the certificate the contractor must execute when
price negotiations are concluded and the contract price is agreed to.
29. 32 C.F.R. § 1-3-807.5(a) (1983) provides in pertinent part:
If. . . certified cost or pricing data is subsequently found to have been inaccu-
rate, incomplete or noncurrent as of the effective date of the certificate, the Gov-
ernment is entitled to an adjustment of the negotiated price, including profit or fee,
to exclude any significant sum by which the price was increased because of the
defective data.
For a more detailed discussion of the government's recovery in a case of defective pricing,
see infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
30. 32 C.F.R. § 1-3-807.1(a)(1) (1983).
[Vol. 33:319
Defective Pricing of Government Contracts
quotations, (c) nonrecurring costs, (d) changes in production methods, (e)
changes in production or procurement volume, (f) data in support of pro-
jections, (g) unit cost trends, (h) make or buy decisions, and (i) significant
management decisions. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
(ASBCA) has followed the DAR's definition of the terms "cost or pricing
data." For example, in Aerojet General Corporation,3 a contractor had
prepared engineering studies and cost analyses tending to show that a sub-
contractor's quotation was unreasonably high. The contractor was actu-
ally using these analyses in simultaneous negotiations with the
subcontractor, but failed to submit them to the government negotiators.
The ASBCA held that the analyses constituted cost or pricing data that
should have been disclosed because they were the "type of facts which
prudent buyers and sellers would reasonably expect to have a significant
effect on the price negotiations and are data which could reasonably be
expected to contribute to the sound estimates of future costs as well as to
the validity of costs already incurred."32
In defining cost or pricing data, the DAR draws a clear distinction be-
tween "judgments" of estimated future costs and "data" upon which such
judgments are based. The judgments alone are not capable of being veri-
fied and are not cost or pricing data. The data on which the judgments are
based, however, are verifiable and do constitute cost or pricing data.33 The
ASBCA also recognized the DAR's distinction between "judgment" and
"data." For example, in E-Systems, Inc. ," appellant furnished a proposal
for the manufacture of electronics modification kits to the Air Force. As
part of the data included in the proposal, appellant listed a manufacturing
overhead rate of 125% and information on past experienced overhead.
The Defense Contracting Auditing Agency (DCAA) recommended accept-
ance. Negotiations were concluded on February 16, 1968, and appellant
executed its certificate of cost and pricing data as of that date. A contract
was awarded in the amount of $6,394,360 for 164 units.
Two and one-half years later, DCAA conducted a routine defective pric-
ing audit and discovered that appellant had prepared a "profit plan" that
had never been furnished to the government. The plan included informa-
tion on projected sales, and indicated a projected overhead rate for manu-
facturing of 91.8%, substantially lower than the 125% rate previously
31. ASBCA No. 12,264, 69-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 7664 (1969),modified, 70-I B.C.A. (CCH)
8140 (1970).
32. Id. 7664, at 35,584.
33. 32 C.F.R. § 1-3-807.3(h)(1) (1983).
34. ASBCA No. 17,557, 74-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,782, reconsid denied, 74-2 B.C.A.
(CCH) 10,943 (1974).
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furnished. DCAA concluded that if this data had been available, the con-
tract price would have been $761,284 lower. The appellant disagreed, and
an appeal followed.
At the hearing, the evidence showed that the "profit plan" was a projec-
tion used for a variety of purposes, including motivation of sales and man-
agement personnel. In effect, the plan was a set of "targets" rather than a
report of firm contract activity or actual backlog. Based on these findings,
the ASBCA first found that the basic underlying data upon which the ap-
pellant's profit plan was based were known by government auditors and
negotiators. The ASBCA then found that the profit plan included inaccu-
racies because it was not prepared in accordance with the appellant's nor-
mal accounting methods and was prepared primarily for training purposes.
As such, the ASBCA concluded that the plan did not have to be dis-
closed.3 5 It also noted that even if the profit plan had been cost or pricing
data, the government's defective pricing claim would be denied because
the government had failed to establish that the failure to disclose the plan
resulted in a higher contract price.a6
Moreover, the contractor's obligation to submit cost or pricing data is
subject to a standard of reasonableness. The contractor's obligation ex-
tends only to data "reasonably available" at the time of the agreement on
price.3 7 Data relating to any significant item is considered to be available
if it is known anywhere in the contractor's organization.38 Contractors
have successfully invoked the DAR's "reasonably available" criterion in
defending against government claims of defective pricing. Thus, for exam-
ple, in LTV Electrosystems, Inc. ,39 the government asserted a defective
pricing claim against the contractor because the latter had failed to update
a bill of materials. The ASBCA rejected the claim, reasoning that al-
though the contractor had more current data in its organization, this was a
rush procurement, and the contractor simply did not have the time or staff
to update the bill of materials. In this situation, the ASBCA held, the data
were not "reasonably available. 'a
35. Id. 10,782, at 51,263.
36. Id.
37. 32 C.F.R. § 1-3-807.3(h)(2) (1983).
38. See 32 C.F.R. § 1-3-807.5(a)(1) (1983) which discusses in greater detail when cost or
pricing data may be said to be reasonably available to the contractor.
39. ASBCA No. 16,802, 73-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 9957, reconsid denied, 74-1 B.C.A.
(CCH) 10,380 (1973).
40. In American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10,305, 65-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 5280
(1965), the Board also recognized that some data, although existing in the contractor's or-
ganization prior to certification, may not be "reasonably available" if it cannot be processed
in time.
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Finally, assuming data are "reasonably available," the contractor does
not fulfill its obligations to submit cost or pricing data by merely making
available to the government the company's books and records without spe-
cific identification of the cost or pricing data.4' The DAR makes clear that
the contractor must actually submit cost or pricing data on DD Form 633,
or in the attachments thereto, as part of the formal proposal submission. 42
A contractor, however, may identify specific data in his proposal where
they are too voluminous to be attached physically. 43
B. The Prima Facie Case
As the discussion below indicates, to make out a prima facie case of
defective pricing, the following elements must be established: (1) the exist-
ence of an executed "Certificate of Cost or Pricing Data" in the govern-
ment's possession; (2) the government's reliance on the noncurrent,
inaccurate, or incomplete data in its negotiations with the contractor; and
(3) the government's reliance on the noncurrent, inaccurate, or incomplete
data caused an increase in the contract price.
To establish a violation of the Truth in Negotiations Act, the govern-
ment must first show that the contractor executed a "Certificate of Cost or
Pricing Data." This certificate is the contractor's statement that the cost or
pricing data submitted is accurate, complete, and current as of the date the
agreement is reached on price. Without this certificate, a contractor can-
not be held liable for failing to disclose cost or pricing data in his posses-
sion." Thus, in Libby Welding Co., Inc. ,4 the contract contained the
required clause permitting a reduction in price in the event of defective
pricing. However, the contractor was not asked to and did not provide a
"Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data" for a contract modification in
excess of $100,000. The government later asserted a defective pricing
claim, but the ASBCA held that the claim was precluded by the absence of
a certificate. The Board noted that the price reduction clause was tied di-
rectly to the certificate. In its absence, a contractor is not liable under the
price reduction clause of the contract. 46
To prevail in a defective pricing action under the Truth in Negotiations
Act, the government must also show that it relied on the defective cost or
41. 32 C.F.R. § 1-3-807.3(h)(2) (1983).
42. Id. § 1-16-806 (1983).
43. See 32 C.F.R. § 1-3-807.3(h)(2) (1983).
44. Libby Welding Co., ASBCA No. 15,084, 73-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 9859 (1972).
45. Id.
46. Id See also Lockheed Shipbuilding & Const. Co., ASBCA No. 16,494, 73-2 B.C.A.
(CCH) 10,157, at 47,768-69 (1973).
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pricing data. 7 The applicable regulation, DAR section 3-807.10(a)(2), es-
tablishes a rebuttable presumption that the government relied on the de-
fective data. This section provides that:
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the natural and
probable consequence of defective data is an increase in the con-
tract price in the amount of the defect plus related burden and
profit or fee; therefore, unless there is a clear indication that the
defective data were not used, or were not relied upon, the con-
tract price should be reduced in that amount. In establishing that
the defective data caused an increase in the contract price, the
contracting officer is not expected to reconstruct the negotiation
by speculating as to what would have been the mental attitudes
of the negotiating parties if the correct data had been submitted
at the time of agreement on price.4
DAR section 3-807.10(a)(2) has been interpreted as shifting the burden of
going forward with the evidence to the contractor.49 The contractor, how-
ever, may shift the burden back to the government by introducing evi-
dence of nonreliance. Once the contractor does this, the government then
has the ultimate burden of proving that it relied on the defective data. °
Finally, the government must show that the submission of defective cost
or pricing data resulted in a higher contract price to the government. DAR
section 3-807.10(a)(2), set forth in the preceding paragraph, presumes that
the "natural and probable" consequence of defective data is an increase in
contract price. Because this regulation provides a rebuttable presumption,
it shifts the burden of going forward with evidence to the contractor. Once
the contractor introduces his evidence, the government then has the bur-
den of proving that defective data actually increased the contract price.
This was made clear in Lear Siegler, Inc. "' There, the contractor pur-
ported to base his proposal on historical average labor hours. The govern-
ment, however, claimed that data for the most recent six months had not
been disclosed and, if disclosed, would have shown reduced labor costs.
The ASBCA rejected the government's claim because the government did
not show that the failure to disclose this data in question caused an in-
crease in the contract price:
47. G. Cuneo, R. Ackerly, J. Lane, Truth in Negotiations Part HI, Briefing Paper No. 68-
4, 1 BPC 319, 325 (1968).
48. 32 C.F.R. § 1-3-807.10(a)(2) (1980).
49. Id.
50. G. Cuneo, R. Ackerly, J. Lane, supra note 47 at 326. See Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
v. United States, 485 F.2d 584, 586 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., v. United
States, 479 F.2d 1342, 1349 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
51. ASBCA No. 20,040, 78-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 13,110 (1978).
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Accordingly, even were we to conclude that the government
made a prima facie showing of the nondisclosure of significant
cost data and we presumed, therefore, that there was a price over-
statement, we would conclude that appellant rebutted that showing,
at least by making the extent of that overstatement so speculative
that not even a jury verdict' would be appropriate. The government
has not shown that the failure to disclose current cost data caused
an overstated price in any reasonably ascertainable amount."
C The Government's Recovery in a Case of Defective Pricing
In the case of defective pricing under the Truth in Negotiations Act, the
government is entitled to a price reduction equal to the amount of the
contractor's cost overstatement plus the appropriate burden, profit, or
fee.5 3 The rule is clearly illustrated in Sylvania Electric Products, Inc."4 In
that case, the ASBCA found that the contractor failed to disclose certain
low quotations for six items of electronic equipment before executing a
Certificate of Cost and Pricing Data. To arrive at the price reduction, the
ASBCA reduced the price of six items of equipment by an amount equal
to the difference between the contractor's proposal price and the low quo-
tation and then added the appropriate overhead and profit. The cost over-
statements for all six items of equipment totalled $202,808 and, with the
negotiated 6% for overhead and 11.6% for profit, the total price reduction
equalled $239,913.75.
The natural and probable consequence of defective data is to increase
the contract price in the amount of the cost overstatement plus related
overhead, profit, or fee. Nevertheless, the contractor may overcome this
presumption by demonstrating that, even if it had disclosed the correct
data, the parties would not have negotiated a price that would have re-
flected the total amount of the overstatement. The contractor meets its
burden of going forward with evidence by reconstructing the course of its
previous price negotiations with the government.
Thus, in Bell & Howell Co. ,55 the government negotiated a contract with
52. Id at 64,070 (emphasis added); but see Universal Restoration, Inc., ASBCA No.
22833, 83-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 16,265 (1983), where the ASBCA reversing its earlier decision
implied that the presumption of 32 C.F.R. § 1-3-807.10(a)(2) (that defective data increased
the contract price) will only be overcome if the contractor can produce evidence clearly
indicating that the government was aware of defective data but elected to ignore it and
award a price higher than the data indicated.
53. 32 C.F.R. § 1-3-807.10(a)(2) (1983).
54. ASBCA No. 13,622, 70-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 8387 (1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 1342 (Ct. Cl.
1973).
55. ASBCA No. 11,999, 68-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 6993 (1968).
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the contractor for M65 fuzes. The ASBCA found that during negotiations
the contractor failed to disclose several low quotations from various sup-
pliers. This failure to disclose resulted in an overstatement of $389,281 or
$0.76 per fuze. The ASBCA refused to grant the government a price re-
duction for the full amount of $389,281 because it was not convinced that
disclosure of the low quotations would have enabled the government to
negotiate a further price reduction of $0.76 per fuze. The contractor estab-
lished that its management would not have agreed to a significantly lower
figure. The final price was lower than the contractor's negotiation team
was authorized to go and the price had to be cleared with top manage-
ment. Furthermore, the ASBCA found that the contractor would have ex-
posed itself to considerable risk if it had based the firm price on the low
quotations. The vendors recently were not producing the parts and were
offering prices substantially lower than those at which the parts had previ-
ously been procured. Accordingly, the ASBCA held that the effect of fail-
ing to disclose the low quotations was a $233,569 increase in the ultimate
price paid by the government.5 6
The contractor may further reduce its liability for defective pricing by
offsetting understatements of cost against overstatements of liability. In
other words, it can reduce its liability by the amount that other defective
data decreased the contract price.57 Set-offs are permitted only up to the
amount of the government's claim in a single pricing action.5" Moreover,
the set-offs need not be part of the same cost category that forms the basis
for the government's price reduction.59
56. To the same effect, see McDonnel-Douglas Corp., ASBCA No. 12,786, 69-2 B.C.A.
(CCH) 7897 (1969) (contractor is not liable for overstated costs reflected in its proposal
that have been eliminated through negotiation of the contract price); but see American
Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10,305, 65-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 5280 (1965), corrected deci-
sion, 66-2 B.C.A (CCH) 1 5747 (1966), vacated, 67-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 6564 (1967) (contract
reduced by the amount of overstatement where contractor fails to produce specific evidence
showing that parties would nonetheless have negotiated a contract price reflecting the
overstatement).
57. 32 C.F.R. § 1-3-807.10(a)(3) (1983); see Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. United States, 416
F.2d 1306, 1309-11 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (court based the rule of offsets on the legislative intent of
the Truth in Negotiations Act).
58. 32 C.F.R. § I-3-807.10(a)(3) (1983); Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. United States, 416 F.2d
at 1309 ; Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., ASBCA No. 20,266, 77-2 B.C.A.
(CCH) 12,823 (1977).
59. 32 C.F.R. § 1-3-807.10(a)(3) (1983).
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II. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT PROHIBITS THE INTENTIONAL SUBMISSION
OF FALSE, FICTITIOUS, OR FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS OR
CLAIMS TO THE GOVERNMENT
The original False Claims Act was passed in 1863 as a result of investi-
gations of the fraudulent use of government funds during the Civil War.6 °
The debates at that time suggest that the Act was intended to reach all
types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to
the government. 6 ' The original Act provided both civil and criminal sanc-
tions in combating the fraudulent activities of those who deal with govern-
ment agencies. The civil provisions of the original Act recently have been
recodified in 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729.62 The House Report makes clear that
the recodification made no substantive change in the Act and that its sole
purpose was to substitute simple language for awkward and obsolete
terms.
6 3
It is important to recognize that the civil and criminal sanctions of the
False Claims Act extend to the corporate entity as well as to corporate
employees. 64 Corporate liability is determined by focusing on the activi-
ties of corporate employees. Corporate liability will be imposed if the cor-
poration's employees, while engaged in the unlawful conduct, were acting
within the scope of their authority and for the purpose of benefiting the
corporation.6 5
.4. The Civil False Claims Statute Imposes Civil Liabilityfor the
Knowing Submission of a False Claim to a Government Agency
I. The Prima Facie Case
The Civil False Claims Statute (31 U.S.C.A. § 3729) imposes civil liabil-
ity on any person not in the United States military or naval forces present-
ing a false, fictitious, or fraudulent claim to the government:66
60. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.
61. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d. Sess. 952-58 (1862).
62. Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 978 (1982).
63. See H.R. REP. No. 651, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1895, 1897. For further details of the early legislative and statutory history of
the False Claims Act, see United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228 (1968); Rainwa-
ter v. United States, 356 U.S. 590 (1958); 26 ALR Fed. 307, 310-11 (1976).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Hangar One, Inc., 563 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174
F.2d 16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949).
65. United States v. Milton Marks Corp., 240 F.2d 838, 839 (3d Cir. 1957); Wagner Iron
Works v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 956, 958 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
66. The discussion that follows is based on judicial precedent interpreting provisions of
the original act, which were previously codified at 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976). Inasmuch as the
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A person not a member of an armed force of the United States
is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of
$2,000, an amount equal to 2 times the amount of damages the
Government sustains because of the act of that person, and the
costs of the civil action, if the person-
1. knowingly presents, or causes to be presented to an office
or employee of the Government or a member of an armed force a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval .... 67
Thus, as the discussion below indicates, to establish a prima facie viola-
tion of section 3729, the government must prove by clear, explicit, and
unequivocal evidence 68 that: (1) there was a presentation of a claim to a
government agency; (2) the claim was false; and (3) the party submitted the
claim either knowing it to be false or with the intent to defraud. Signifi-
cantly, because the courts have construed section 3729 to permit recovery
of the $2,000 forfeiture without proving actual damages, 69 a violation of
section 3729 often occurs upon the mere submission of a false claim.
Therefore, the government's reliance on the claim is not essential.
For purposes of determining liability under section 3729, it is essential
that a "claim" was made or presented to a government agency or depart-
ment. In United States v. Neifert- White Co. ,7 the Supreme Court refused
to accept a rigid and restrictive reading of the term "claim." In that case,
the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) was authorized to make loans
to grain growers to finance the construction or purchase of storage facili-
ties. The loans were not to exceed 80% of the purchase price of the storage
bins. The CCC required grain growers to support loan applications with
invoices showing the price of the bin. The defendant, a dealer in storage
bins, prepared invoices for growers in which the purchase price was delib-
erately overstated. The invoices were then submitted to the CCC along
with the loan application. Based on this evidence, the government brought
suit contending that false claims were made in violation of section 231.
The defendant argued that an application for a CCC loan, as distinguished
from a claim for payment of an obligation owed by the government, is not
a "claim" within the meaning of the statute. The Court rejected the de-
recodification of 31 U.S.C.A. § 231 in 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 involved no substantive change,
the cases apply with equal force to an analysis of 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (1982). The full text of
31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (1982) prohibits six types of conduct. For our purposes we need focus
only on the prohibition set out in the text because, for reasons discussed in Part III, it en-
compasses a case of defective pricing.
67. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (1982).
68. United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 123 (9th Cir. 1970).
69. United States v. Rohleder, 157 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1946).
70. 390 U.S. 228 (1968).
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fendant's assertion and held that a "claim" encompassed all attempts to
cause the government to pay out sums of money:
Analogous reasoning leads us to hold today that the False
Claims Act should not be given the narrow reading that [defend-
ant] urges. This remedial statute reaches beyond 'claims' which
might be legally enforced, to all fraudulent attempts to cause the
Government to pay out sums of money. We believe the term
'claim,' as used in the statute, is broad enough to reach the con-
duct alleged by the Government in its complaint.7 '
Judicial opinion confficts as to the type of "intent" required to constitute
a violation of section 3729. Some courts have held that in order to be
liable under section 3729 for the submission of a false claim, a specific
intent to defraud the government must be found.7 2 Other courts, however,
have held that a specific intent to defraud need not be proven and that the
knowing submission of a false claim is sufficient to sustain liability.73
Confusion surrounds the application of these two standards. For example,
some courts, while appearing to endorse strongly one of the two standards,
have referred to both standards as if they were one.74
In United States v. Mead,75 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that an intent to defraud must be found to sustain lia-
bility under the statute.76 In Mead, the government brought suit against
the defendant, a contractor-farmer, to recover alleged overpayments made
to the defendant under the Agriculture Conservation Program. Under this
program, the government reimbursed participating farmers for a percent-
age of the construction cost of conservation ditches. Payments were to be
made directly to the contractor who performed the work. To obtain pay-
ment, the contractor was required to submit invoices and execute forms
indicating the cost of the construction of the ditches. The defendant, an
inexperienced businessman, construed the program's relatively new regu-
lations and forms as permitting him to submit to the government claims
71. Id at 233 (emphasis added).
72. United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 122 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Ueber,
299 F.2d 310, 315 (6th Cir. 1962); United States v. Priola, 272 F.2d 589, 594 (5th Cir. 1959);
United States v. National Wholesalers, 236 F.2d 944, 950 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
930 (1956); United States v. Schmidt, 204 F. Supp. 540, 543-44 (E.D. Wis. 1962).
73. Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 527 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'd on
other grounds, 385 U.S. 138 (1966), reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967); Fleming v. United
States, 336 F.2d 475, 480 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 907 (1965); United States v.
Fox Lake State Bank, 225 F. Supp. 723, 725 (N.D. II. 1963).
74. See United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d at 123; Fleming v. United States, 336 F.2d at
479.
75. Mead, 426 F.2d at 118.
76. Id at 122.
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for payment which represented the market value of the work. Thus, when
the defendant submitted his claims to the government for payment with
invoices attached showing prices higher than the cash price actually
charged to the farmer, the government brought suit. The defendant con-
tended that the invoices were not false, and, even if they were, the govern-
ment had not shown an intent to defraud.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the government's contention that the statute
was violated. The court noted that while the invoices were false, the gov-
ernment failed to prove an intent to defraud." The court stated that the
Civil False Claims Statute was not intended to catch the hapless and inex-
perienced. Moreover, it noted that while only two of the six types of con-
duct proscribed by the statute explicitly required an intent to defraud,
there was no reason to assume that Congress eliminated this intent re-
quirement for the other types of conduct proscribed by the statute.7 8
Contrary to Mead, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held, in Fleming v. United States," that a specific intent to defraud
need not be proven and that the knowing submission of a false claim is
sufficient to sustain liability under the Civil False Claims Statute.8" In
Fleming, the defendant was a certified grain dealer under the Emergency
Feed Program. Under this program, farmers made application for emer-
gency feed to their county committee. If a farmer was determined to be
eligible for assistance, the county issued a purchase order for a specified
amount of grain, which the farmer then transferred to a certified dealer as
payment for the grain. The dealer in turn presented the purchase order to
the county in exchange for a Dealers Certificate at a face value equal to the
value of the purchase order. Before the dealer presented a purchase order
to the county, he was required to certify that he had sold and actually
delivered to the farmer the specified surplus grain.
The evidence in Fleming revealed that the defendant received Dealer
Certificates and later negotiated them without ever having delivered grain
to farmers. The defendant's sole defense to the government's suit was that
77. Id at 124. The court used the terms "intent to deceive" and "intent to defraud"
interchangeably. However, as will be discussed in the fraud and false statements analysis of
18 U.S.C. § 1001, courts that have construed this statute have distinguished between an "in-
tent to deceive" and an "intent to defraud." See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
78. Mead, 426 F.2d at 122-24. The two types of conduct the court referred to are: (1)
conspiring to defraud the United States by obtaining the payment of a false or fraudulent
claim; and (2) delivering with intent to defraud a receipt for property without a full knowl-
edge of the truth of the facts stated therein. This conduct is now set forth in 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 3729(3) and (4) respectively. 426 F.2d at 123.
79. 336 F.2d at 475.
80. Id
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the government had failed to prove that the defendant had intentionally
defrauded the United States.8 ' The Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant's
contention. The court held that because the statute states the terms "false,
fictitious, or fraudulent" in the disjunctive, in order to prove a violation of
the statute the government need only establish that a party knowingly sub-
mitted a "false" claim.82
2 Government Recovery Under the Civil False Claims Statute
Under section 3729, the government may recover (1) double its actual
damages, (2) a $2,000 forfeiture for each false claim, and (3) costs of the
suit. 83 The Supreme Court has held that damages under section 3729 are
intended to "afford the Government complete indemnity for the injuries
done it."84 The Court has ruled that "the chief purpose of the statutes here
was to provide for restitution to the government of money taken from it by
fraud, and that the device of double damages plus a specific sum was cho-
sen to make sure that the government would be made completely
whole."85
The basic rule of law for computing damages under section 3729 is the
difference between the amount the government actually paid in reliance on
the false claims and the amount it would have paid had the contractor
been truthful.86 Under section 3729, the government has the burden to
prove what it would have paid absent the fraud.8 7 Unlike the Truth in
Negotiations Act,88 where the regulations create a rebuttable presumption
that the government is entitled to a price reduction equal to the amount of
the cost overstatement plus appropriate overhead and profit, no such pre-
sumption aids the government in meeting its burden of proof under section
3729. Moreover, the government may not use speculation or guesswork to
establish the amount of damages. It must prove its losses with sufficient
specificity to allow a reasonable estimate of the damages. The govern-
81. Id at 478.
82. Id. at 480. When 31 U.S.C. § 231 was recodified in 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 the term
"fictitious" was eliminated. The statute now addresses "false" or "fraudulent" claims. 31
U.S.C.A. § 3729 (1982).
83. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (1982).
84. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943).
85. Id. at 551-52;see also United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976); United States
v. Beatrice Foods Co., 330 F. Supp. 577 (D. Utah 1971).
86. Brown v. United States, 524 F.2d 693 (Ct. Cl. 1975); United States v. Woodbury,
359 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. American Precision Prod. Corp., 115 F. Supp.
823 (D.N.J. 1953).
87. Brown v. United States, 524 F.2d 693 (Ct. Cl. 1975); United States v. Sawin, 243 F.
Supp. 744 (S.D. Iowa 1965); United States v. MacMurtrie, 206 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
88. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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ment's failure to meet its burden of proof under section 3729 may relieve
the contractor from paying anything more than nominal damages, and
may even relieve it from paying any damages at all.8 9 The government
fulfills its burden of proof only if it shows that the claimed damages are, in
the language of the statute, "because of' the doing of the fraudulent act. 9°
It must establish a direct causal connection between its losses and the de-
fendant's fraudulent conduct. 9 ' Consequential damages are not recover-
able under the statute because they are not directly caused by the
submission of false claims. 92
In cases involving misrepresentation of cost estimates, damages are
based upon the amount that the contractor actually overcharged the gov-
ernment as a result of the misrepresentation. 93 In these cases, as in cases
under the Truth in Negotiations Act, amounts eliminated in price negotia-
tions are deducted from the total amount of the overstatement. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Foster Wheeler Corp. ,9 the contractor entered into
a contract with the Navy to sell replacement boilers and related spare parts
for Navy vessels. In preparing its price proposal, the contractor estimated
its costs to be $1,242,380. If the contractor had added its usual mark-up of
25.32%, its proposal price would have been $1,556,919. However, the con-
tractor instead used a mark-up of 40%, which resulted in a proposal price
of $1,739,336. To conceal this unusually high mark-up, the contractor in-
cluded a 25.32% mark-up in its cost and price analysis on the government
DD Form 633, and increased its estimate costs to $1,427,042 by inflating
various items. In short, the contractor predetermined a price that would
assure it a very high profit and then created false cost figures to substanti-
ate that price.
In Foster Wheeler, the court calculated the government's damages by
first applying the disclosed 25.32% mark-up to the contractor's true cost
estimate of $1,242,380. It then subtracted that amount ($1,556,919) from
the amount actually proposed ($1,739,376). It further reduced the remain-
der ($182,417) by amounts eliminated during price negotiations and found
89. See United States v. Collyer Insulated Wire Co., 94 F. Supp. 493 (D. R.I. 1950)
(court assessed double nominal damages plus allowed the government to recover the $2,000
forfeiture on each of the 105 false claims the contractor submitted); see also Little v. United
States, 152 F. Supp. 84 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
90. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982).
91. United States v. Hibbs, 568 F.2d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 1977).
92. United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1011 (5th Cir. 1972).
93. The rule is the same for misrepresentation of actual costs. See Ueber, 299 F.2d at
310.
94. 316 F. Supp. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), mod!fiedon other grounds, 447 F.2d 100 (2nd Cir.
1971).
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that the government had been overcharged by $132,209. The court
awarded the government twice the $132,209 overcharge actually sustained
as a result of the fraud.95
In addition to damages, section 3729 entitles the government to a $2,000
forfeiture for each false claim submitted. Since these damages are primar-
ily punitive in nature, liability is enforced whether or not the contractor is
liable for actual damages. Thus, in United States v. American Precision
Products Corp. ,96 the contractor submitted six invoices containing false
statements. The government paid only four of the six. The court, how-
ever, held the contractor liable for $2,000 on each of the six invoices be-
cause "forfeitures go regardless of damages."97
In determining the number of forfeitures the government may recover,
the Supreme Court has stated that the "number of imposable forfeitures
has generally been set at the number of individual false payment demands
that the contractor has made upon the government."98 In Brown v. United
States,99 the court assessed a $2,000 penalty for each of the fourteen
purchase orders submitted for payment under the contractor's various bid
rigging schemes."°° The government, however, cannot recover more than
one forfeiture for a single false claim no matter how many times the claim
is submitted.'O'
The United States Supreme Court has held that a contractor can only be
assessed forfeitures for those false payment demands over which it had
knowledge and control.' °2 In Bornstein, a subcontractor, "United," con-
tracted to supply electron tubes to a prime contractor, "Model," under
Model's contract with the government. United knowingly sent three sepa-
rately invoiced shipments of defective tubes. Model, unaware of the de-
95. Id at 973; see also United States v. Sytch, 257 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1958).
96. 115 F. Supp. 823 (D.N.J. 1953).
97. Id at 827-28; see also United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir.
1966); Toepleman v. United States, 263 F.2d 697 (4th Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Cato Bros.,
Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 989 (1959) (proof of actual damages is not a prerequisite to
the recovery of forfeitures because the investigation necessary to detect a false claim costs
the government money even if no money is paid on the claim).
98. Bornstein, 423 U.S. at 309 n.4; see also, Fleming, 336 F.2d at 480.
99. 524 F.2d 693 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
100. Id. at 705-06.
101. Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, rev'don other grounds, 385
U.S. 138 (1965), reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967). The court in Acme noted that where a
contractor submits one false claim that is denied by the government and thereafter resubmits
the same claim, the government is only entitled to one $2,000 forfeiture. The court noted
that such a situation is different from one where a contractor submits to the government
numerous vouchers each containing a separate and distinct false claim. In this situation, the
government is entitled to multiple forfeitures. 347 F.2d at 527.
102. United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976).
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fects, incorporated the tubes into the radio kits and shipped them to the
government. Model sent thirty-five invoices to the government, requesting
payment for the defective tubes. The United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey held that there had been thirty-five forfeitures. Ac-
cording to the court, United's fraudulent acts "caused Model to submit
thirty-five false claims, each of which constituted a separate violation justi-
fying a separate forfeiture."' 10 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and
held that there was only one forfeiture. The court focused upon United's
conduct rather than upon "the fortuity of the number of invoices submit-
ted by the main contractor.' There was a single forfeiture because
United's fraud affected the performance of a single purchase order from
Model to United. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Third
Circuit's decision and held that there were three forfeitures. 105 The Court
found that United's acts had nothing to do with the fact that Model sub-
mitted thirty-five false claims. The number of false claims submitted by
Model was completely fortuitous as far as United was concerned. United
could not be held liable for thirty-five forfeitures when the number of false
claims was beyond United's knowledge and control. 10 6
The Court clearly distinguished the acts committed by Model from
those committed by United. It emphasized that the False Claims Act "pe-
nalizes a person for his own acts, not for the acts of someone else. ''
Thus, the proper test for determining the number of forfeitures focuses on
an evaluation of the conduct of the person liable for the statutory forfeit-
ures. 0 8 In reversing the Third Circuit's decision, the Court also ruled that
the number of forfeitures under the Act is not measured by the number of
contracts involved in a case. It stated that the language of the statute fo-
cuses on false claims, not on contracts. To focus on the number of con-
tracts would result only in a single forfeiture in most cases, which would be
contrary to the language and purpose of the Act. 10 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently ap-
plied the "knowledge and control" test in United States v. Ehrlich. 0 In
that case, the defendant general contractor for a low-income housing pro-
103. United States v. Bornstein, 361 F. Supp. 869, 879 (D.N.J. 1973).
104. United States v. Bornstein, 504 F.2d 368, 376 (3d Cir. 1974).
105. 423 U.S. at 313. The court held that there were three forfeitures because United
sent three separately invoiced shipments to model.
106. 423 U.S. at 312.
107. Id
108. Id at 313.
109. Id at 311.
110. 643 F.2d 634 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 854 U.S. 940 (1981).
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ject entered into an agreement with the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) under which HUD insured the mortgage for the pro-
ject and subsidized a portion of the interest payments. HUD paid the in-
terest subsidies directly to the mortgagee, who submitted monthly
vouchers to HUD. The agreement provided that the contractor would esti-
mate costs at the beginning of the project. At the end, if the actual costs
were less than estimated, the contractor was required to repay a portion of
the principal to the mortgagee. One year after the contractor entered the
agreement, it prepared and submitted (1) a Mortgagor's Certificate of Ac-
tual Cost, and (2) a Contractor's Certificate of Actual Cost. Both certifi-
cates overstated actual construction costs to relieve the contractor from
repaying a portion of the principal.
The Ehrlich court held that the mortgagee's monthly vouchers were false
claims under the Act."' The concept of a claim includes a demand for
money. The court ruled that due to Ehrlich's false certifications, the inter-
est subsidies demanded and paid each month were falsely inflated individ-
ual claims. Accordingly, the contractor was liable for seventy-six
forfeitures on the basis of seventy-six monthly vouchers. The court re-
jected the contractor's argument that he should be liable for only one for-
feiture because he did only one act-that of inflating the actual
construction costs-that caused false claims to be filed. The court applied
the Bornstein ruling and held that the number of forfeitures equals the
number of false claims that the contractor knowingly causes to be filed. In
this case, the contractor knew that a false claim would be filed each month
and did nothing to prevent the filing of additional false claims. It was the
contractor's knowledge and control of the situation that rendered him lia-
ble for seventy-six forfeitures.
B. The Criminal False Claims Statute Imposes Criminal Liability for the
Knowing Submission of a False Claim to a Government
Agency-The Prima Facie Case
The Criminal False Claims Statute (18 U.S.C. § 287), imposes criminal
liability on any person who presents a false, fictitious, or fraudulent claim
to the government:
Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil,
military, or naval service of the United States, or to any depart-
ment or agency thereof, any claim upon or against the United
States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim
111. Id at 637.
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to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Thus, to establish a prima facie violation of section 287, the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) there was the presentation
of a claim to a government agency; (2) the claim was false; and (3) the
party submitted the claim knowing it to be false, and with "criminal in-
tent," i.e., with consciousness that he was doing something wrong or that
he acted with a specific intent to commit an act that violated the law.
In the prosecution of a criminal false claim, the first issue is whether a
"claim" was made to a government agency. It appears that the broad defi-
nition of claim as set forth in Neifert- White, 12 will apply to section 287
suits as well, 1 3 inasmuch as 18 U.S.C. § 287 and 31 U.S.C. § 3729 are
part of the same statutory scheme, under the False Claims Act. Thus, any
fraudulent attempt to cause the government to part with its money will
constitute a claim.
The intent element of section 287 is satisfied if the government can
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted (1) with knowl-
edge that a claim was false or fictitious or fraudulent, and (2) with con-
sciousness that he was doing something that was either morally wrong or
had violated the law. In United States v. Maher," 4 the defendant was
charged with submitting false vouchers to a government agency. The de-
fendant's corporation had entered into various contracts with the Depart-
ment of the Army. The corporation's monthly billings to the Army were
based upon time sheets filled out and signed by the corporation's employ-
ees working on the Army contracts. The defendant had instructed the cor-
poration's bookkeeper to inflate the billings to the Army by increasing the
hours reflected on the employees' time sheets. The defendant contended
that he lacked any intent to defraud the government, and therefore, could
not be prosecuted under section 287.
The court disagreed with the defendant's interpretation of the intent ele-
ment of section 287 and held that section 287 does not require the govern-
ment to show an intent to defraud. Section 287 only requires that the
defendant submit a claim knowing it to be false and with consciousness
that he was doing something wrong or that he acted with a specific intent
to do something the law forbids. The court cited three reasons in support
of its conclusion that section 287 does not require an intent to defraud:
112. 390 U.S. 228; see supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
113. See United States v. Winchester, 407 F. Supp. 261, 272 (D. Del. 1975) (cases con-
struing the civil branch of the False Claims Act are relevant to the interpretation of the
criminal branches of the Act).
114. 582 F.2d 842, 847 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. I115 (1979).
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First, we do not find that the statute specifies an intent to de-
fraud as an element to be proved under § 287. The language of
the statute states the terms, Yalse, fictitious or fraudulent,' in the
disjunctive, and we interpret this to mean that three kinds of claims
may be submitted in violation of§ 287 and not merely claims which
are fraudulent ....
Second, in applying general principles of criminal law, the trial
court added the element of "willfulness" or criminal intent to the
requirements of the government's case, and we think correctly re-
fused to define criminal intent under § 287 solely in terms ofpurpose
or motive. Criminal intent may be proved either by a showing that
the defendant actedfor a specific purpose to violate the law or that
he acted with an awareness that what he was doing was morally
wrong, whether or not he had actual knowledge that he was doing
something that the lawforbids ....
Third, we think that § 287 does not require proof of a specific
intent to defraud, as defendant defines that term, because thepur-
pose of§ 287 will not befurthered by limiting criminal prosecutions
to instances where the defendant is motivated solely by an intent to
cheat the government or to gain an unjust beneft ... 15
C. The Criminal False Statements Statute Imposes Criminal Liability for
the Knowing and Willful Submission of a Material False
Statement To a Government Agency-The Prima
Facie Case
The Criminal False Statements Statute (18 U.S.C. § 1001) punishes
false, material statements made knowingly and willfully concerning a mat-
ter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any depart-
ment or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully fal-
sifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent state-
ments or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or
document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 6
115. Id at 847-48 (emphasis added); United States v. Milton, 602 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.
1979).
116. There are two parts to § 1001. The first clause imposes liability for the knowing
falsification, concealment or covering up by trick, scheme, or device of a material fact. We
limit our analysis to the second, more commonly applied "false statement" clause, although
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Thus, the courts have recognized that the five elements necessary to sustain
a conviction under section 1001 are: (1) the submission of a statement; (2)
the statement was submitted with the intention that it bear a relation to
some matter within the jurisdiction of a department of the United States;
(3) the statement was material; (4) the statement was false; and (5) the
party submitted the statement knowing it to be false.
To sustain a conviction under section 1001, there first must be a "state-
ment." It would appear that any writing can constitute a "statement." For
example, the government successfully prosecuted an individual under sec-
tion 1001 who had submitted false time sheets to a United States mar-
shal." 7 A contractor's submission of a false statement of costs to a
government agency also satisfied the "statement" requirement of section
1001.'"8 Moreover, the term "statement" also has been construed to in-
clude statements not made in writing." 9
To sustain a conviction under section 1001, it must be established that a
statement relating to some matter within the jurisdiction of a department
or agency of the United States was made. Significantly, it is not necessary
that the defendant actually present the false statement to the department
or agency. This point is well illustrated in Ebeling v. United States.120 Ap-
pellant Emerling, a prime contractor, entered into a contract with the
Army for the production of mortar conversion kits. The contract con-
tained a statutorily required price redetermination clause, which mandated
that the contractor file a statement of costs. In an attempt to hide his prof-
its and, thus, avoid the effect of the price redetermination clause, Emerling
entered into a subcontract with appellant Ebeling. Under this subcontract,
Ebeling sent phony invoices to Emerling for work never performed.
Emerling purported to pay these invoices and noted these payments in his
statement of costs submitted to the Army. In their defense, appellants con-
tended that because they had not actually presented the false invoices to
the Army, they had not submitted a false statement that could be regarded
as relating to a matter within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of
the United States. The court rejected this argument, holding that
Emerling's inflated statement of costs reflected the false invoices and thus,
as will become apparent in Part II, arguably either clause could apply to a case of defective
pricing. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
117. United States v. Godwin, 566 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1978).
118. Ebeling v. United States, 248 F.2d 429 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, sub noma. Emerling v.
United States, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
119. United States v. Adler, 380 F.2d 917, 922 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006,
(1967).
120. 248 F.2d at 429.
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affected the Army's monitoring of contract costs, a matter clearly within its
jurisdiction.
As part of the government's case in a section 1001 prosecution, it must
prove that a "material" false statement was submitted to a government
agency.' 2 ' While the requirement of "materiality" explicitly applies only
to the "trick, scheme, or device" clause of section 1001, courts have in-
ferred a judge-made limitation of "materiality" on the "false statement"
clause of section 1001 as well.'22 The purpose of the "materiality" require-
ment is to exclude trivial falsehoods from the purview of the statute. 123
Thus, the courts have adopted a test to determine whether a statement is
"material." The test is whether the statement "has a natural tendency for
influence, or was capable of influencing the decision of the tribunal in
making a determination required to be made."' 124
Application of this test was neatly demonstrated in United States v.
Lichenstein,125 where, the defendants were convicted of falsely designating
as "vessel supplies" 1,150 cases of bonded scotch whiskey on a United
States Customs form. They challenged on appeal the trial court's finding
that their falsification was a material false statement under section 1001.
In denying the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit found that the effect of the defendants' falsification precluded the
Customs Bureau from furnishing to the Bureau of Census information
needed to compile import-export statistics: "Pervasive falsifications of this
nature obviously would totally pervert these statistics and undermine the
efforts of the Customs and Census officials assigned to collect the data."'' 26
Significantly, the "materiality" requirement of section 1001 can be satis-
fied even if the false statement did not cause the government any pecuni-
ary loss.'27 Moreover, the "materiality" requirement is satisfied even if the
government fails to establish that it relied on the false statement. In United
121. Unlike 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 18 U.S.C. § 287 does not explicitly state that materiality is
an element of the offense. Some courts have indicated that because the two statutes have a
similar purpose, materiality is also an essential element of 18 U.S.C. § 287. See, e.g., United
States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287, 1291 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d
645, 652 n.12 (4th Cir. 1974); contra, United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 682 (10th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
122. United States v. Beer, 518 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1975).
123. United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v.
Beer, 518 F.2d 168, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1975)).
124. Gonzales v. United States, 286 F.2d 118, 122 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
878 (1961) (quoting Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1956)).
125. 610 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980).
126. Id at 1279; see Baker, 626 F.2d at 515.
127. United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941); United States v. Krause, 507 F.2d
113, 117 (5th Cir. 1975).
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States v. Coastal Contracting and Engineering Co. , 28 a contractor know-
ingly submitted fictitious statements in connection with a change order
proposal. These statements were not relied upon by the government nego-
tiator because he thought the prices were entirely out of line. Nevertheless,
the court found that the contractor had violated section 1001.129
Finally, intent under section 1001 is shown if the submission of the false
statement was done knowingly, willfully, and with the intent to deceive. 13
0
Intent to defraud is not a prerequisite to liability under section 1001.131
The distinction between "intent to deceive" and "intent to defraud" was
addressed in United States v. Godwin. 132 In Godwin, the defendant was
convicted by the trial court of submitting false time sheets to a United
States Marshal. On appeal, the defendant claimed that he lacked intent to
defraud the government. In denying the appeal, the court found that since
section 1001 was designed to protect the government against those who
would cheat or mislead it, proof of an intent to deceive was sufficient to
sustain a conviction under this section. The court distinguished "intent to
deceive" from "intent to defraud" as follows:
Intent to deceive and intent to defraud are not synonymous.
Deceive is to cause to believe the false[hood] or to mislead. De-
fraud is to deprive of some right, interest or property by deceit.
Since the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is to protect the govern-
ment against those who would cheat or mislead it in the adminis-
tration of its programs, a charge that includes specific intent to
deceive along with the other elements mentioned above comports
with 18 U.S.C. § 1001.133
Having set forth the prima facie case for the previously discussed stat-
utes, we are now in a position to discuss their applicability to a defective
pricing action. The discussion in Part II indicates, however, that while the
statutes are similar in a number of respects, they do contain some signifi-
cant differences. These similarities and differences will become more ap-
parent as we apply these statutes to our hypothetical problem set forth in
Part III of this article.
128. 174 F. Supp. 474 (D. Md. 1959).
129. Id at 479-80; see also Blake v. United States, 323 F.2d 245, 247 (8th Cir. 1963).
130. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d at 1276.
131. Godwin, 566 F.2d at 975.
132. Id
133. Id. at 976. See United States v. Johnson, 284 F. Supp. 273 (W.D. Mo.), aff'd, 410
F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 822 (1969) (18 U.S.C. § 1001 does not require
that the government prove a specific intent to defraud).
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III. APPLICATION OF ANALYSIS TO HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM
In this section we explore in the context of a hypothetical example the
government contractor's liability for defective pricing under the Truth in
Negotiations Act and the False Claims Act. 134 At the same time we ex-
plore the interrelationship between the two Acts. A graphic illustration of
the relationship between the two Acts may be found in Appendix A.
A. Hypothetical
Smith Corporation was awarded a defense contract by the Air Force for
the replacement of 500 Warhawk computer terminals. The contract called
for delivery of fifty terminals a week, the first delivery due six months after
contract award and the remaining deliveries due every two weeks thereaf-
ter. Once the terminals were installed, Smith was to provide consulting
and programming services for a period of three months. The contract was
a negotiated defense contract in excess of $500,000 and was subject to the
requirements of the Truth in Negotiations Act.
As part of Smith's pricing proposal for the supply of the 500 Warhawk
computer terminals, Smith submitted its cost figures, which consisted of
estimated labor hours, material costs, and vendor quotations on DD Form
633. With respect to the consulting services, the government negotiators
informed Smith that the price for these services would be based on the
education and experience of its employees. The greater the education and
experience the more Smith could charge. As part of Smith's pricing propo-
sal for these services, Smith submitted on DD Form 633 resumes reflecting
the education and experience of its employees. Smith and the government
negotiators reached agreement on price; Smith then executed a cost or
pricing certificate certifying the accuracy, completeness, and currency of its
cost or pricing data as of the date the agreement was reached.
Smith delivered according to schedule the 500 computer terminals.
Each delivery, ten in all, was accompanied by DD Form 250 invoicing the
government at prices based on previously submitted cost or pricing data.
Smith also successfully completed its consulting and programming services
and submitted one invoice to the government for its services. Six months
134. In United States v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 447 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1971), the contrac-
tor argued that the Truth in Negotiations Act withdraws defective pricing from the False
Claims Act because under the rules of statutory construction, the general statute, the False
Claims Act, must yield to the specific, the Truth in Negotiations Act. The court disagreed
with the contractor and held that the Truth in Negotiations Act does not supersede the False
Claims Act. It emphasized that "there is no inconsistency between an act which deals with
fraud and one which deals with data which are inaccurate, incomplete or noncurrent." Id
at 101. Thus, the same defective pricing actions may constitute a violation of both Acts.
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after Smith provided its consulting and programming services, the DCAA
conducted a routine defective pricing audit. The audit revealed that Smith
realized on its Air Force contract a profit of 30% on cost as compared to an
estimated profit shown on its DD Form 633 of 10% on cost. The auditors
discovered that Smith Corporation had inflated its vendor quotations by
10% before submitting those quotations to the government. It was also
discovered that Smith had failed to disclose labor hour data on compo-
nents which were similiar to, but not identical with, major components of
the Warhawk and that the estimated labor hours contained on its DD
Form 633 and supporting schedules for the Warhawk were some 15%
higher than the labor hours for the comparable components. The audit
further revealed that Smith overstated its price for consulting services by
embellishing the resumes of its employees. The investigation concluded
that, as a result of Smith Corporation's activities, the federal government
was overcharged $200,000.
B. Analysis of Hypothetical
As the discussion below indicates, the same acts that constitute a viola-
tion of the Truth in Negotiations Act may also establish liability under the
False Claims Act. However, our analysis further reveals that a contractor's
defective pricing actions may violate the Truth in Negotiations Act with-
out violating the False Claims Act and vice versa.
The facts of our hypothetical case reveal that Smith Corporation
manipulated and withheld cost or pricing data from the government, the
effect of which was to enable Smith to realize a significant profit on its Air
Force contract. These facts appear to make out a prima facie case of de-
fective pricing under the Truth in Negotiations Act.
First, in connection with the negotiation of its non-exempt government
contract, Smith Corporation executed a Certificate of Cost or Pricing Data
when it reached agreement on price with the government. Thus, unlike
Libby Welding Co. ,' we are not faced with a situation where the govern-
ment is precluded from asserting a defective claim because of the absence
of a certificate.
Second, the labor hour data on components which were similar to, but
not identical with, major components of the Warhawk was clearly cost or
pricing data as defined by DAR § 3-807.1(a)(1) and accordingly should
have been presented to the government during price negotiations. This
cost data consisted of facts "which prudent buyers and sellers would rea-
135. ASBCA No. 15084, 73-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 9859 (1972). See supra notes 44-46 and
accompanying text.
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sonably expect to have a significant effect on price negotiations." 136 More-
over, as a result of Smith Corporation's (1) inflation of Vendor quotations,
(2) failure to submit labor hour data on comparable components, and (3)
submission of embellished resumes, the information submitted on DD
Form 633 was inaccurate and thus did not satisfy the requirement under
the Truth in Negotiations Act that cost or pricing data be accurate, com-
plete, and current. In short, Smith Corporation's cost or pricing data was
defective.
Third, in price negotiations, the government relied on Smith's defective
data. Fourth, the government's reliance on Smith Corporation's defective
data, resulted in the government paying higher prices for the computer
terminals and the consulting services.
Turning to the question of damages under the Truth in Negotiations
Act, the government is entitled to a price reduction equal to $200,000, the
amount of Smith Corporation's cost overstatement plus the appropriate
overhead and profit. To the extent that Smith Corporation can show that
(1) even if it had disclosed correct data, the parties would not have negoti-
ated a price reduced by the total amount of the overstatement,137 or (2)
that it understated certain of its contractual costs, the government's recov-
ery will be reduced accordingly. 138
The same hypothetical facts also appear to establish a violation of the
False Claims Act. In this regard, each of the three relevant statutes dis-
cussed in Part II of this paper is considered separately.
1. The Civil False Claims Statute
Smith Corporation's submission of defective cost or pricing data on DD
Form 633, its subsequent certification of that data as accurate, complete,
and current, and its subsequent invoices to the government on DD Form
250, are all acts that establish a prima facie violation of The Civil False
Claims Statute (31 U.S.C.A. § 3729).
First, all three acts fall within the definition of "claims" under section
3729, as they were "attempts [by Smith] to cause the Government to pay
out sums of money."''
39
Second, Smith Corporation's claims were all false; the DD Form 633
was false because it contained inaccurate cost or pricing data. The data
reflected inflated cost figures and embellished resumes. The Certificate of
136. 32 C.F.R. § 1-3-807.1(a)(1) (1983) See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
138. Id
139. Neifert- White Co., 390 U.S. at 233. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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Cost or Pricing Data was false because it certified that the data were accu-
rate when they were not. The DD Form 250's were false because they
contained prices based on the inaccurate data.
Third, Smith acted with the apparent requisite intent, whether intent is
defined as the "knowing submission" of false claims' 4 ° or a submission
with "intent to defraud."'' Our hypothetical facts suggest that Smith
knowingly and intentionally manipulated cost or pricing data in order to
negotiate a higher price with the government for the 500 Warhawk com-
puter terminals and the consulting and programming services.
As a result of Smith Corporation's actions, the government may recover
(1) double its actual damages, (2) a $2,000 forfeiture for each false claim,
and (3) its costs of suit. Like the computation of damages under the Truth
in Negotiations Act, actual damages under section 3729 are computed by
determining the amount of the cost overstatment due to the false data,
subtracting amounts eliminated during negotiations, and then adding ap-
propriate burden and profit. 42 Thus, assuming that Smith's cost over-
statement was not eliminated in any amount during price negotiations, it
appears that Smith would be liable for at least $400,000 in actual damages.
With respect to Smith Corporation's liability for forfeitures, the number
of imposable forfeitures is generally set at the number of individual false
payment demands over which the contractor had knowledge and con-
trol.143 Moreover, the government cannot recover more than one forfei-
ture for the very same false claim.' Thus, the application of these rules to
our hypothetical case requires an assessment of eleven forfeitures or
$22,000 on the basis of the eleven DD Form 250's Smith Corporation used
in invoicing the government. Note that while Smith's other acts-the sub-
mission of DD Form 633 and the execution of a Certificate of Cost or
Pricing Data-also constitute false claims, Smith should not be assessed
additional forfeitures because the government then would be collecting
twice on the very same false claims.
145
2. The Criminal False Claims Statute
Our hypothetical facts also establish a prima facie violation of the Crim-
140. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
142. Foster Wheeler Corp., 316 F. Supp. at 968, 973. See supra notes 94-95 and accompa-
nying text.
143. United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1975). See supra notes 102-09 and accom-
panying text.
144. Acme Process Equipment Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 527 (Ct. C1. 1965).
145. Id.
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inal False Claims Statute (18 U.S.C. § 287). First, the submission of de-
fective cost or pricing data on DD Form 633, the subsequent certification,
and the subsequent invoices to the government on DD Form 250's certify-
ing prices based on that data are all claims within the definition of Nefert-
White. 4 6 Second, for the reasons already set forth in our discussion of
section 3729 liability, the DD Form 633's, the Certificate, and the DD
Form 250's were all false. Third, the intent element of section 287 appears
to be satisfied. Smith's inflated cost figures and embellished resumes of its
employees suggest that Smith acted with knowledge that a claim was false
and with consciousness that it was doing something that violated the
law. 147
3. The Criminal False Statements Statute
Our hypothetical facts also appear to make out a prima facie violation of
the Criminal False Statements Statute (18 U.S.C. § 1001).
First, the DD Form 633's, the Certificate, and the DD Form 250's are all
"statements" under section 1001, inasmuch as each document is a written
representation to the government of Smith Corporation's cost or pricing
data, the accuracy of that data or the prices ultimately based on that data.
Second, these statements relate to matters within the jurisdiction of a gov-
ernment agency as all were made to the Air Force as part of that agency's
procedure for the pricing and payment of government contracts. Third,
for the reasons noted above, all the statements were false.
Fourth, these statements were "material" within the meaning of section
1001. The submission of defective cost or pricing data and its subsequent
certification resulted in a higher contract price. Clearly, an unjustifiable
contract price, obtained in violation of the Truth in Negotiations Act,
would be material in the sense that such a price works to impair the func-
tioning and efficiency of the Air Force's procurement branch whose mis-
sion is to negotiate the best price for the government.' 48 Even if Smith's
false statements did not cause an increase in the contract price, they argua-
bly would be material because they had the capability of impairing the
functioning of the Air Force's procurement branch. 149 Moreover, Smith's
invoices to the government on the DD Form 250's were material in that
they sought payment of sums that Smith Corporation had no right to
collect.
146. 390 U.S. at 233. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
147. Maher, 582 F.2d at 847. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
148. United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d at 1278. See supra notes 125-26 and accom-
panying text.
149. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d at 1278.
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Fifth, the intent element of section 1001 appears to be satisfied. Once
again, the inflated cost figures and the embellished resumes suggest that
Smith Corporation made the false statements knowingly, willfully, and
with the intent to deceive the government during price negotiations.' 50
Thus, in our hypothetical example the same acts that constitute defective
pricing under the Truth in Negotiations Act also establish liability under
the False Claims Act. However, not all violations of the Truth in Negotia-
tions Act necessarily constitute violations of the False Claims Act. It is
possible, therefore, that the government may successfully prosecute a gov-
ernment contractor for defective pricing under the False Claims Act but be
unsuccessful in prosecuting the contractor for the same acts under the
Truth in Negotiations Act. These points can be neatly demonstrated by
modifying our hypothetical example.
For example, suppose that the government's price negotiation memo-
randa reveal that the negotiators never relied on Smith's inflated cost
figures or embellished resumes. Rather, the memoranda establish that
prior to Smith's proposal submission, Air Force negotiators had arrived at
a contract price range by surveying what other Department of Defense
(DOD) agencies were paying for similar computer terminals and consult-
ing and programming services. The memoranda further reveal that be-
cause the low end of the contract price range was higher than Smith's
proposal submission even with the inflated cost figures and embellished
resumes, the Air Force negotiators "jumped" at Smith's proposal price
without actually relying on the information contained in the proposal.
Under these circumstances the government's defective pricing action under
the Truth in Negotiations Act would be defeated because the government
would be unable to prove that it relied upon Smith's defective cost or pric-
ing data in negotiating the contract price and that such reliance resulted in
a higher contract price.
Contrary to the result under the Truth in Negotiations Act, the govern-
ment's failure to prove reliance, and that the defective data resulted in a
higher contract price, would not defeat its action under the False Claims
Act. Under section 1001, the government need not prove that it detrimen-
tally relied on a false statement. It must prove that Smith submitted a
material false statement. As discussed earlier, materiality is defined in
terms of whether the statement had the capability of influencing or impair-
ing the functioning of a government agency. The statement, therefore,
need not cause the government pecuniary loss.' 5' Thus, in our modified
150. Id. at 1276.
151. Id. at 1278.
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hypothetical example, the requirement of materiality would be deemed
satisfied because Smith's mere submission of defective data, regardless of
whether that data was relied on or its economic effect, was capable of influ-
encing or impairing the functioning of the Air Force's procurement
branch.
The result would probably be the same under the Criminal False Claims
Statute (18 U.S.C. § 287). Unlike the Criminal False Statements Statute
(18 U.S.C. § 1001), the Criminal False Claims Statute (18 U.S.C. § 287)
does not explicitly state that materiality is an essential element of the of-
fense. Therefore, courts are divided on the question of whether materiality
is an element of a section 287 suit.'52 The courts that have held that mate-
riality is an element of section 287, while not specifically addressing the
issue, would probably adopt the section 1001 definition of materialty and
conclude that materiality is satisfied regardless of whether the government
relied to its detriment on the false claim. Those courts that have held that
materiality is not an element of a section 287 offense probably would focus
on the submission of a false claim. The question of detrimental reliance
would be irrelevant. Thus, Smith probably would be liable under section
287 whether or not the government established detrimental reliance.
In section 3729 suits, courts have permitted recovery of the statutory
forfeiture ($2,000) without requiring that actual damages be proven.' 53
Thus, the government need not show detrimental reliance in order to as-
sess forfeitures under section 3729.
Now, let us modify the intent element of our hypothetical example.
Suppose, for example, that Smith Corporation failed to disclose certain
vendor quotations because it believed that such quotations were inaccurate
and unreasonably low, and thus, unreliable for purposes of pricing. More-
over, suppose that Smith inadvertently made an error while transposing
figures from its work sheets to its pricing proposal, resulting in an increase
in the contract price.
Under these circumstances, Smith Corporation would still be held liable
under the Truth in Negotiations Act for any overstatement in contract
price caused by the submission of defective cost or pricing data. The fact
that Smith had honorable intentions and did not intentionally withhold
cost or pricing data from the government is irrelevant. The Truth in Nego-
tiations Act and the implementing regulations address the question of de-
fects in the data and not individual or corporate intent in determining
152. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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liability. Any culpability or lack of it on the part of Smith Corporation
does not affect its obligation to refund the money.
Smith Corporation, however, could probably escape liability under the
False Claims Act. Before liability under the False Claims Act could be
found, the government would have to prove that Smith Corporation
presented a false claim or statement with the requisite intent. Specifically,
in order to prevail under section 3729, the government would have to es-
tablish that Smith Corporation presented a false claim either with the in-
tent to defraud or knowing that such a claim was false. Under section 287,
the government would have to establish that Smith Corporation knowingly
submitted a false claim with the consciousness that it was doing something
that was morally wrong or that violated the law. Under section 1001, the
government would have to establish that a false statement was submitted
knowingly, willfully, and with the intent to deceive. The fact that Smith
Corporation believed the data to be inaccurate and unreliable and that
Smith inadvertently submitted defective data would negate the proposition
that it had the intent to violate the False Claims Act. Absent such intent,
there can be no violation of the False Claims Act.
In summary, the same acts that constitute liability under the Truth in
Negotiations Act may also establish liability under the False Claims Act.
Our analysis also reveals that a party may escape liability under the Truth
in Negotiations Act, but be found liable under the criminal and civil provi-
sions of the False Claims Act. Thus, if the federal government does not
rely on defective cost or pricing data, or if there is no price increase as a
result of the submission of defective cost or pricing data, the government is
not entitled to a price reduction under the Truth in Negotiations Act.
Nevertheless, neither reliance nor actual damages are necessary to sustain
a criminal conviction or civil liability under the False Claims Act. On the
other hand, not all violations of the Truth in Negotiations Act necessarily
constitute violations of the False Claims Act as well. Only in those in-
stances where a party submitted defective data to the government during
contract price negotiations with the requisite intent, can liability also be
imposed under the False Claims Act.
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